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categories of agents. Indeed, as shown by the literature of the persistent inequality 
(e.g. Banarjee and Newman, 1993; Piketty, 1997), taking in account the asymmetric 
impact of the financial imperfections on wealthy and poor agents changes the pace of 
the Kuznets (1955)  relationship between economic development and income 
inequality. In this paper we try to analyze the effect of introducing profit-sharing 
financial contract between banks and entrepreneurs on the evolution of the capital 
accumulation/income inequality relationship. It is interestingly shown that income 
inequality disappears when the economy reaches a second stage of development. 
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Abstract 
 
The relationship between economic development and income inequality isn’t neutral vis-à-
vis the role of the financial system in responding to the needs of different categories of agents. 
Indeed, as shown by the literature of the persistent inequality (e.g. Banarjee and Newman, 1993; 
Piketty, 1997), taking in account the asymmetric impact of the financial imperfections on 
wealthy and poor agents changes the pace of the Kuznets (1955)  relationship between economic 
development and income inequality. In this paper we try to analyze the effect of introducing 
profit-sharing financial contract between banks and entrepreneurs on the evolution of the capital 
accumulation/income inequality relationship. It is interestingly shown that income inequality 
disappears when the economy reaches a second stage of development. 
 
Key Words: Financial imperfection, profit sharing, inequality, capital accumulation. 
JEL Classification: D6, O16. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades the income inequality in many developed countries has widen. For 
example, in OECD countries the inequality of incomes has increased since mid-1980s such that 
the income of the richest 10% of people was nearly nine times that of the poorest 10% in 2005 
(OECD, 2008). As mentioned by OECD (2008) this situation could degenerate in social unrest 
fueled by the confining of the political power by a few wealthy citizens. Therefore, economists 
should provide urgent and innovative solutions to the unequal growth which constituted also one 
of the triggering ingredients of the recent Arab spring revolution namely in Tunisia and Egypt. 
 
The analysis of the relationship between economic development and income inequality has 
been debated by economists for a long time since the seminal work of Kuznets (1955). This 
study argued that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between the two variables: income 
inequality increases in a first stage of development before decreasing. More recent studies (e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Perotti, 1996) confirm the result of 
Kuznets (1955). However, taking in account the asymmetric impact of the financial 
imperfections on wealthy and poor agents changes the pace of the relationship between 
economic development and income inequality as illustrated by the Kuznets curve. Indeed, 
another branch of the literature called the theory of persistent inequality (e.g. Banarjee and 
Newman, 1993; Piketty, 1997) shows that if credit markets are imperfect then poor dynasties 
face limited investment opportunities and the catching up of wealthy dynasties isn’t always 
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possible even at advanced stage of development. Consequently, it has been shown that an 
improvement in financial markets, contracts, and intermediaries reduces income inequality 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). Thus, it is clear that the relationship between economic 
development and income inequality isn’t neutral vis-à-vis the role of the financial system in 
responding to the needs of different categories of agents. According to Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2009, p.2) « The financial system influences who can start a business and who cannot, 
who can pay for education and who cannot, who can attempt to realize one’s economic 
aspirations and who cannot. Thus, finance can shape the gap between the rich and the poor and 
the degree to which that gap persists across generations.” Clarke et al. (2003) argues that policy 
makers should know whether “finance” can be used as an instrument to affect income inequality.  
 
Yet, observing the recent widening of income inequality in many countries we might 
conclude that the influence of policy makers on “finance” through taxation and monetary policy 
is ineffective. It is therefore legitimate to imagine a new financial mechanism leading to lower 
inequality while insuring sustainable growth. According to Chapra (1985) economic growth isn’t 
by itself of prime importance if not accompanied by the reduction of inequalities, full 
employment and broad-based economic well-being. In order to achieve these goals he advocates 
for the establishment of equitable money and banking system. Criticizing the traditional 
capitalism he argues that “high or low interest rates are the result of restrictive or liberal 
monetary policies adopted in the larger national interest. There is no reason why the entrepreneur 
or the financier should be the only one to suffer or benefit from such polices. Why shouldn’t the 
gains or the losses be equitably distributed between them?” (Chapra, 1985, p217). In order to 
achieve what he called equitable distribution of gains and loss between the entrepreneur and the 
financier, he suggest considering a profit-and-loss sharing mechanism which guarantees the 
convergence of the two parties’ interest while interacting with the economic conditions as the 
interest rate do. 
 
In this paper we try to analyze the effect of introducing profit-sharing financial contract 
between banks and entrepreneurs on the evolution of the capital accumulation/income inequality 
relationship. Many studies analyzed the microeconomic and macroeconomics effects of 
substituting interest-fixed contracts by profit-sharing contracts. Ahmed (2000) develops a model 
analyzing the incentive to an entrepreneur to under-report his profit in the case he should share it 
with a bank at an agreed ratio. He proposes an incentive-compatible profit-sharing contract that 
reduces the moral hazard problem. The suggested incentive mechanism is based on a 
reward/punishment mechanism involving collateral and random audit. Ul Haque and Mirakhor 
(1986) develop an IS-LM-like model with profit-sharing contracts and show that the economy 
behaves as an economy with debt contracts when information is perfect and the environment is 
certain. However, in presence of uncertainty they show that the level of investment may increase 
under certain conditions. The reason behind this is that profit-sharing contracts allow greater 
utilization of capital and higher profitability. Khan (1987) develops a model to analyze the effect 
of the substitution of interest by PLS on the market of loanable funds. He shows that using profit 
shares as an instrument of monetary policy would be inefficient. In addition he points out that the 
PLS contracts finance the more profitable projects. However, it is well-known that the problem 
with profit-sharing contracts is the excessive cost of monitoring required to enforce them (Khan, 
1987). There is a large literature showing that debt dominates profit sharing (equity contracts) in 
presence of information problems and costly monitoring. For example, in Townsend (1979) and 
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Gale and Hellwig (1985) debt is optimal because it minimizes monitoring costs. However, these 
studies show also that the debt contract is not ex post efficient because underinvestment can 
occur.  
 
Our concern in this paper is about the effect of profit-sharing financial contracts on the 
evolution of the “income inequality” with capital accumulation process. To this end we will start 
from a modified version of Aghion and Bolton (1997) model where we integrate two new 
features. The first feature is costly contract enforcement as a second type of credit market 
imperfection in addition to the moral hazard problem. The second feature is enabling, contrarily 
to Aghion and Bolton (1997), wealthy agents to undertake larger projects. It is interestingly 
shown that income inequality disappears in a second stage of development.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. 
Section 3 describes the financial contract. Sections 4 and 5 characterize respectively 
entrepreneurs and banks. Section 6 is devoted to the analysis of occupational choices and credit 
market equilibrium. I investigate the evolution of the wealth inequality in section 7 and illustrate 
the results through a numerical example in section 8. Finally, section 9 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
The economy is closed and contains a sequence of one-period-lived overlapping generations.             
An initial generation of old entrepreneurs coexists with young agents at date t = 0. Each 
generation is composed of a continuum of mass 1 agents indexed by i. Each agent has one 
offspring and works or invests. Agents are risk-neutral and their utility depends only on 
consumption and bequest. Hence, an agent divides the income he receives between consumption 
and bequest. The only source of heterogeneity among agents is their inherited wealth . Each 
agent i is endowed with one unit of effort (labour) . He may choose to undertake a project 
requiring a minimum fixed investment of  that generates an uncertain revenue from 
an investment  which is given by 
 
 
where  and  denotes the probability of success which is equal to 1 if the agent 
supplies his entire effort. We assume that there is an effort cost . At the 
beginning of his life an agent decides the effort to supply and how to invest his inherited wealth 
. At the end of his lifetime, the individual allocates his net final wealth  between consumption 
and bequest. As in Aghion and Bolton (1997) agents are assumed to have Leontieff preferences 
over consumption and bequest. Therefore, the optimal bequest is a linear function of end of 
period wealth   and is given by  where 1 − δ is the saving 
propensity of individuals. We assume that at date t = 0, a proportion π of the young agents has a 
low inherited wealth (resulting from the initial old generation’s bequests) and 
constitutes the class . The remainder proportion 1 − π which constitutes the class  has a 
higher inherited wealth  verifying . An agent of class  born at date t ≥ 0 
with an initial wealth  such that  could self-finance his project but may have an incentive 
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to ask for a bank loan in order to enlarge it. Even if his project succeeds, an agent may default on 
the loan if it is more profitable to do so. In this case, the bank seizes a fraction  of the 
produced output. The unseized fraction 1 − λ corresponds to an enforcing repayment cost which 
could be related to the efficiency of the legal system1. For an agent with an inherited wealth 
 who isn’t granted a loan there is no choice but depositing his wealth in a bank.  
 
3. Financial contract 
An agent of class  can self-finance a project if his inherited wealth  is superior to the 
minimum fixed investment . He may also ask for a bank loan di t for an additional investment. 
We deviate from the debt contract considered in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Nabi (2009) and 
we consider the following contingent financial contract  where  denotes the share of the 
output that will be paid back to the bank. Hence the repayment is 
 
 
(1) 
where the probability of success is given by . 
 
 
4. Entrepreneurs 
An agent with an inherited wealth  is obliged to ask for a loan of an amount 
 in order to undertake a project. If the agent’s inherited wealth is sufficient to self-
finance a project  he will ask for a loan  to enlarge the project if he could recuperate 
higher revenue relatively to a self-financed project:  which imposes the 
following constraint on the loan’s amount 
 
(2) 
In the two previous cases, the final revenue of the entrepreneur is increasing with the loan’s 
amount. We will discuss later the maximum amount that he will be grant. Hence, an agent who 
undertakes a project whether through self-financing or banking funding will choose the effort  
to supply in order to maximize his expected revenue net of both repayment and effort costs 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
                                                            
1
 Krasa et al (2008) has also considered an enforcement problem in the legal system which rests on two key 
parameters. The first one is the efficiency of enforcement captured by the cost paid to secure rights in court.                     
The second one is the percentage of total assets that a court can seize. 
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Note that for the case and  the agent will self-finance his project. The solution 
to problem  is presented in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
                 
 
 
Proof: See the appendix. 
It is clear from (4) that the higher the bank’s share  in the output the lesser the agent’s effort 
devoted to increase the probability of success of his project when his wealth is inferior to the 
threshold  and the external financing is inferior to . However, when the latter reaches the 
threshold  the probability of success becomes 1. Note that when the agent self-finances his 
project he devotes the maximum effort (case ii). 
 
5. Banks 
In order to prevent the borrower’s default, the repayment should be at most equal to the 
default’s cost. The default cost is equal to the output the bank is willing to seize in case of 
success of the project which is . Hence, we should impose which 
gives us using equation (1) the following condition: . Therefore, the bank’s share shouldn’t 
exceed the fraction that could be seized. In this case, and given that the economy comprises at 
each date t a continuum of agents belonging to the two classes (the class of low inheriting wealth 
and the high inheriting one) and that the random returns on risky projects are independently and 
identically distributed the proportion of successful projects in class i is . Hence, the aggregate 
repayment banks receive from class i = l, h are deterministic and respectively given by 
 and  where  denotes the proportion of agents of class i = l, 
h who are granted a loan. Hence, it is possible to define  the aggregate deterministic gross 
return on loans for class i = l, h as follows or equivalently 
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(5) 
where  is given by (4). At this stage, we should make the following assumption regarding 
the amount of loans banks are willing to provide for an agent of class i = l, h. 
 
 
 
Hence, when the two types of agents can’t undertake a project without external financing                  
(case i), banks provide no more than the missing amount to reach an overall financing of . 
Therefore, banks are willing to finance the maximum of projects. In case ii, when only agents of 
class l needs external financing and agents of class h could be interested in enlarging their 
projects than banks are willing to offer the latter the same amount as agents of class l. Finally, in 
case iii banks also provide the two categories of agents with the same amount which is 
determined by the equilibrium of the credit market. 
 
6. Occupational choice and credit market equilibrium 
 
6.1 Occupational choice 
An agent i = l, h of generation t with an initial wealth  will prefer to undertake a project 
rather than deposit his wealth in a bank if it procures him higher expected revenue. 
 
(6) 
where  is defined by (3) and proposition 1 and  represents his final wealth which will 
finance his consumption and bequest. The occupation of agent i depends not only on hid choice 
but also on the choice of agents belonging to the other class . The following proposition 
presents the possible occupational choices for agents of the two classes i = l, h.  
 
Proposition 2 
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Proof: See the appendix. 
 
The different configurations presented in proposition 2 share a common feature: when the 
bank’s share exceeds a determined threshold then the agents’ occupational choice will shift from 
entrepreneurship to depositing or self-financing. 
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6.2 Credit Market Equilibrium 
Banks finance loans by the deposits they collect from agents having chosen depositing as an 
occupation and/or from those preferring entrepreneurship but who are credit rationed. It is the 
competition between agents belonging to each class to obtain a loan and competition between 
banks on the assets as well as on the liabilities sides which lead to the equilibrium of the credit 
market. Competition between agents is driven by the bank’s share  they are willing to accept. 
Below a determined threshold, the higher this share the greater the expected return banks could 
obtain from granting loans to agents of class i. The latter will compete in order to obtain a loan 
until a proportion of them become indifferent between undertaking a project or depositing their 
wealth in a bank. Therefore, at the equilibrium the banks’ optimal share  equals the minimum 
threshold that makes one of the two class of agents indifferent between depositing and 
entrepreneurship. Due to competition between banks on the asset side this share is fixed even for 
agents who still prefer strictly entrepreneurship rather than depositing. On the liabilities side, the 
return on deposits is equal to the aggregate return on loans. The following proposition 
characterizes the equilibrium of the credit market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 3 
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Proof. 
 
Let’s begin by prooving case i) where the wealth of both classes of agents are not sufficient 
to finance their projects. In this case, as shown by proposition 2, they are incited to ask for loans 
whenever banks are willing to offer them a profit sharing contract  such that . 
 
 
 
As shown by figure 1 the expected return  on loan granted to an agent of class I increases as 
the share  of the bank increases from 0 to 1/2 where it reaches its maximum before declining 
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from 1/2 to 1. This nonlinear relationship is due to the conjunction of two opposite effects. In 
one hand, the bank profits from higher proportion of the entrepreneur’s output in case of success 
of the project. In the other hand, the entrepreneur reduces his effort and therefore the probability 
of success as his share in the output decreases. In this case, his expected net revenue given by                  
decreases as the bank’s share increases. As far as the expected revenue from 
entrepreneurship is superior to the final wealth he obtains from deposit, the agent competes to 
obtain a loan. From proposition 2 (case i) it is clear that this competition leads agent i to increse 
 until  or . Using the expression  from proposition 2 and noting that                       
 it is clear that . Note that there are two forces 
pushing toward the equilibrium. The first force is the agent’s own strategy which consists in 
offering the bank’s a share  superior to  offered by agent . The second force is the 
effect of the agent j’s strategy which consists in increasing  (eventually to 1/2 which 
maximizes the banks’ gross expected return) to offer the bank higher expected return  which in 
the same time reduces the threshold  of the competing agent since . Figure 3 
illustrates the convergence to the equilibrium E which could be characterized by one of the three 
possible configurations   or  . 
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From figure 3 it is clear that the share  at the equilibrium equals where                  
 is the solution to the equation . Therefore, we obtain 
 and it can be easily shown that  
 
 
 
Note that there are two cases characterized by where the two types of agents 
compete and become indifferent between the two occupations at the equilibrium. Let’s now 
analyze case ii) where  and . The following figure presents the evolution of the 
three possible configurations of the equilibrium resulting from proposition 2. 
 
12 
 
 
In configuration (a) we have  and  which implies that agents "l" are 
indifferent between depositing and entrepreneurship and agents "h" prefer strictly becoming 
entrepreneurs. Configurations (b) and (c) verify respectively  and  as well as 
 which imply that agents “l” and “h” prefer strictly becoming entrepreneurs in 
configuration (c). However, agents “h” are indifferent between the depositing and the 
entrepreneurship occupations. Although in case ii-1) of proposition 2 the threshold  matters in 
the occupational choice of agents “h”, this is not the case for the equilibrium. It is due to the fact 
that . Indeed, since  is concave in  with a minimum at . It is easy to show that 
and  which enables us to conclude that . Let’s note 
that case               ii-2) of proposition 2 couldn’t take place in the equilibrium. Indeed, from the 
previous analysis the only interaction between agents that could lead to  is configuration 
(b). However, once  agents “h” become indifferent between depositing and asking for a 
bank loan. 
 
Hence, there is no further force that will push  above  . Finally, we have to determine the 
equilibrium for case iii) where and . From proposition 2, it is clear that the 
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interaction between the two types of agents stops when such 
that agents “h” are no more interested in loans to enlarge their projects and agents “l” prefer 
becoming entrepreneurs. Since   then we conclude from proposition 2 
that agents “h” become depositors and agents “l” become entrepreneurs. Since the total deposits 
of agents “h” is  and the proportion of agents “l” is π then we conclude that the loan’s 
amount is  
 
 
 
Proposition 3 indicates the occupational choices of the two types of agents. Agents preferring 
strictly becoming entrepreneurs could be credit rationed if the total amount of deposits banks 
collect is less than the total amount of requested loans. The following lemma recapitulates the 
possible configurations. 
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Proof. See the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Wealth dynamic and income inequality  
The dynamic of wealth accumulation is given by 
 
 
where is the consumption fraction and  the wealth of an agent   at the end 
of is life. If the agent is a depositor we have . If he is an entrepreneur who obtained a 
loan then his final wealth is given by 
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To analyze the evolution of the income inequality from date t to t + 1 between the two 
classes of agents we have to compare to    where   denotes the per capita 
wealth income of class i = l, h. 
 
 
 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the profit sharing contract changes the dynamic of wealth dynamic 
toward income equality. This result is totally different from that obtained in Nabi (2009) who 
considered the same theoretical framework except the financial contract which is the classic debt 
one. The intuition of this result is the following: when the wealth of the rich class exceeds the 
threshold  they prefer deposit it in the bank and profit from the higher expected return on 
deposits rather than competing with the less wealthy agents who are willing to offer banks higher 
profit-sharing ratio. Consequently, the entrepreneurship enables the latter to catch-up the initially 
wealth class. The following figure recapitulates the different configurations presented in                       
Lemma 1 while précising for each corresponding region whether the wealth inequality decreases 
(-), increases (+) or remains constant (0). 
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8. Numerical example 
In this section we simulate numerically the evolution of the wealth inequality (measured by 
the GINI index) for different initial conditions. The expression of the GINI index at date t could 
be derived from the figure 7 and is given by  which is equivalent to the following 
expression 
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It is easy to verify that perfect equality of wealth distribution  occurs when .               
For the numerical illustration of the results, I consider the following parameters’ values: 
 and . This means that initially agents “h” and “l” 
are respectively endowed with 10% and 2.5% of the investment project’s minimal size Figures 7 
shows the dynamic of the GINI index and that of the banks’ share. It illustrates clearly the 
proposition 4 showing that the wealth inequality increases or decreases in a first stage and then 
disappears (Gt = 0). Besides, the banks’ share is initially equal to the maximum level 50% and 
stabilizes at 20%. 
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9. Conclusion 
This paper belongs to the literature analyzing how “finance” affects the relationship between 
economic development and income inequality. Particularly, I analyzed the effect of introducing 
profit-sharing financial contract between banks and entrepreneurs on the relationship between 
capital accumulation and income inequality. To this end I departed from the theoretical model of 
Nabi (2009) and substituted the debt contract with a profit-sharing contract. The intuition behind 
this was the possible superiority of the latter from an “income inequality” perspective. Indeed, 
the optimal financial contract literature (e.g. Townsend,1979 and Gale and Hellwig, 1985) 
recognized the possible ex-post inefficiency of the debt contract (in term of underinvestment) 
while showing its optimality in term of reducing monitoring costs. Interestingly, I show that 
substituting the debt contract by a profit-sharing contract modifies the relationship between 
capital accumulation and income inequality. Indeed, contrarily to Nabi (2009) I showed that 
income inequality disappears in a second stage of development. 
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